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Two agents negotiate, according to the Nash bargaining solution, over the
allocation of a single (divisible) commodity (or multiple commodities with
xed ordinal preferences). It has been shown that in this situation agents
nd dominant to report their least risk averse utility functions. This result
depends crucially on the fact that in this kind of \distortion game," agents
have been restricted to report risk-averse utility functions. This paper studies
the distortion game originated when agents are also allowed to claim non
risk-averse utility functions. Contrasting with previous literature, we nd




When two persons bargain it is often the case that they have no incentives to
reveal their true preferences.1 Nevertheless, standard bargaining procedures
I would like to acknowledge valuable discussions with Leonid Hurwicz and Marcel
Richter. I also want to thank Beth Allen, Yakar Kannai and Luis S anchez-Mier for their
comments. All remaining errors are mine.
1Examples of this simple fact can be seen in every day negotiations. A buyer might
be willing to pay a high price for a commodity, but actually pretend to be uninterested in
order to obtain a better deal.
1assume complete knowledge of the agents' utility functions. This issue is
addressed in the literature by dening a \distortion game" in which agents
strategically report utility functions and the outcome of the negotiation is
determined by applying, for example, the Nash bargaining solution concept.
Up to now, the reports of agents have been restricted to very particular
families of utility functions. This is acceptable if the distortion game is in-
terpreted as a mechanism used by an arbitrator in order to obtain, despite
untruthful reports, an outcome with desirable properties. We think that dis-
tortion games can also be used to model situations in which no arbitrator is
used. In this setting, it is not reasonable to require from agents to report
within a specic class (e.g. concave) of functions.
The main contribution of this paper is to analyze the case in which the re-
ported utility functions are not restricted to be risk-averse. We see no reason
for an agent that does not restrain from misrepresenting his utility function
to limit himself to risk averse claims. It is even more important to analyze
this case taking into account that the conclusions deduced from this work
dier substantially from the previous literature. In particular, instead of a
unique dominant strategy equilibrium, we nd multiple Nash equilibria. In
fact, a continuum of Pareto optimal allocations can be supported by Nash
equilibrium strategies. Finally, as we are not anymore in a dominant Nash
strategy equilibrium, the issue of who plays rst becomes relevant.
1.2 Literature Overview
The simplest distortion game2 that has been studied is that one in which two
risk averse agents bargain over the distribution of a single (divisible) com-
modity. The simplicity of this example includes two aspects: First, when
considering just a single commodity, the ordinal preferences of the agents are
unique, and so cannot be misrepresented. Thus, the strategic possibilities
of the agents are limited to choose the cardinal utility function representing
their ordinal preferences. Second, it is well known that as an agent becomes
2The distortion game technique was rst used by Kurz [11] in reference to a taxation
game in Aumann and Kurz [1].
2less risk averse, his Nash bargaining outcome actually improves.3 The fact
that bargainers can only claim to have concave (risk averse) utility functions
leads to the existence of a dominant strategy equilibrium: agents claim the
least risk averse strategy among those admissible by the distortion game.
Following the spirit of the last paragraph, Crawford and Varian [4] (for the
single commodity case), and Kannai [7] (for multiple commodities) nd dom-
inant strategies for risk averse agents with xed ordinal preferences. They
show that it is optimal for agents to report their least concave (linear in the
single commodity case) representation of their ordinal preferences. If only
one commodity is distributed, these reports lead to equal division of the com-
modity.
In this work, despite not existing a dominant strategy, we characterize the
set of Nash equilibria of the distortion game. To achieve this we proceed
as follows: Proposition 1 gives an explicit method of how to manipulate the
utility possibility set, the set of utility vectors over which Nash b argaining
will be applied. Then, Proposition 2 recalls a property of Nash Bargaining4
that puts a lower bound (in terms of the reported utilities) to the worst
possible result of the negotiation for either agent. Proposition 3 character-
izes the Nash equlibria of the distortion game if the UPS is convex. Finally,
Proposition 4 characterizes the allocations that can result from agents play-
ing Nash equilibria. It is particularly appealing that the method of proof is
constructive in the sense that we explicitly describe how agents can improve
their outcome if they are not playing a Nash equilibrium.
It is important to mention other distortion games analyzed in the literature.
In particular, papers by Sobel [15], [16],5 and Kibris [9] study the multiple
commodity case when the ordinal preferences are not xed. In this instance,
the set of Nash equilibria has not been characterized. It is necessary to re-
strict agents to report linear utility functions in order to characterize Nash
equilibrium outcomes. In particular, Sobel [15] gives a \non-pathological ex-
ample" of non-linear Nash equilibria.
3The rst references that prove this are Kihlstrom, Roth and Schmeidler [10](for two
agents), and Nielsen [14] (for multiple agents).
4This property is known in the literature as symmetric monotonicity [15] or midpoint
dominance [17].
5In this particular work the bargaining concept used is the utilitarian solution.
32 Notation and the Environment
Consider an environment with two agents and n commodities. Without loss
of generality assume there is one (divisible) unit of each commodity so that
the aggregate endowment is described by the vector~ 1 = (1;:::;1) 2 Rn. Let
the complete preorders 1 and 2 denote the agents' continuous, convex and
strictly monotone preferences over the set X = [0;1]n. Let u1 and u2 denote
the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions of the agents. Normalize
the original utility functions so that ui(~ 0) = 0 and ui(~ 1) = 1 for i = 1;2.
As the Nash bargaining solution satises invariance under positive ane
transformations, there is no loss of generality in using this normalization.
Dene:
U = fu : X ! [0;1] j u(~ 0) = 0;u(~ 1) = 1;u continuous, strictly increasingg:
Ui = fu 2 U j u represents ig for i = 1;2:
Assume that ui 2 Ui for i = 1;2. Notice that concavity of ui is not required.
Given two utility functions u1;u2 2 U the utility possibility set (UPS) is
given by
UPS(u1;u2) = f(v;w) 2 [0;1]
2 j 9x 2 X s.t. v  ~ u1(x) and w  ~ u2(~ 1   x)g:
The set UPS(u1;u2) is not necessarily convex. The Pareto frontier of this
set is described by the function h : [0;1] ! [0;1] where for any given level of
utility v 2 [0;1]
h(v) = maxf~ u2(~ 1   x) j x 2 X and ~ u1(x) = vg:
4The following lemma describes the properties of the function h. For com-
pleteness, the proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 1 Given two utility functions u1;u2 2 U, the function h that de-
scribes the Pareto frontier of the set UPS(u1;u2) satises h(0) = 1, h(1) = 0,
and is strictly decreasing (thus invertible). Furthermore, if u1 and u2 are
(strictly) concave, then h is (strictly) concave.
An immediate implication of the lemma is that the UPS generated by two
concave utility functions is a convex set.6 (See Billera and Bixby [2] or Chip-
man and Moore [3].)
Our objective is to study a bargaining problem generated by the strategic
choice of a utility function representing xed ordinal preferences. For exam-
ple, suppose that agent 1 is interested in changing the UPS Pareto frontier
by reporting utility function ~ u1 2 U instead of the real u1.7 In particular,
assume that his intention is to transform the Pareto frontier into one that is
characterized by the equation w = ~ h(v). We claim that if agent 1 knows the
function h describing the original Pareto frontier, then he is able to report
a utility function that achieves the desired transformation. Furthermore,
the explicit formula for ~ u1 is given. As a byproduct, the proposition also
shows that any continuous, strictly decreasing function ~ h once normalized,
is a possible description of some UPS Pareto frontier. This is an important
dierence with the case in which agents are restricted to report concave util-
ity functions.
Proposition 1 Assume that ~ h is a strictly decreasing (hence invertible) con-
cave function such that ~ h(0) = 1 and ~ h(1) = 0. Then agent 1 can transform
the original UPS Pareto frontier into ~ h by claiming that his (unchanged)
ordinal preferences are represented by the utility function
6Concavity of the utility functions is essential for Lemma 1 to hold in an environment
with more than two players. Kannai and Mantel [8] provide a three player counterexample
in which agents with continuous, convex and strictly monotone preferences never generate
a convex UPS, no matter the utility functions used to represent the ordinal preferences.
7From now on, ui will be used to denote the true utility functions of the agents.
5~ u1(x) = ~ h
 1(h(u1(x))):
Proof: The value that the new function takes at v 2 [0;1] is
max
~ u1(x)=v
u2(~ 1   x) = max
~ h 1(h(u1(x)))=v
u2(~ 1   x) = max
h(u1(x))=~ h(v)
u2(~ 1   x):
Using the fact that the maximizer x 2 X is Pareto optimal we conclude that
max
h(u1(x))=~ h(v)
u2(~ 1   x) = max
u2(~ 1 x)=~ h(v)
u2(~ 1   x) = ~ h(v):
The transformation applied to u1 so that it transforms into ~ u1 is ~ h 1h. This
is a monotone transformation because it is the composition of two strictly
decreasing functions8, so the preferences of agent 1 remain unchanged. 
3 The Distortion Game
The question now is what happens if both agents act strategically and the
outcome is determined by Nash bargaining. We use the utility vector (0;0)
as the threat point in case of disagreement. If the UPS is not convex, then
the outcome of the distortion game is decided by the toss of a coin: each
agent has equal probability of being allocated the aggregate output.
Next, we formally describe the distortion game.
Denition 1 Let S be a nonempty convex subset of R2 and let d = (d1;d2) 2
S. Dene the Nash bargaining utility vector [13] as
NB(S;d) = argmaxv2S;vd(v1   d1)(v2   d2):
Convexity of S implies that NB(S;d) is always a singleton.
8As ~ h is strictly decreasing, its inverse also has this property.
6Denition 2 The distortion game is a non-cooperative game in which
agents report utility functions ~ u1; ~ u2 2 U1  U2. If UPS(~ u1; ~ u2) is convex,
there must exist a vector x 2 X such that
NB(UPS(~ u1; ~ u2);(0;0)) = (~ u1(x); ~ u2(~ 1   x)):
The payos of the game are given by the vector   2 R2 dened as:








Notice that because ordinal preferences are known, there is no need to specify
a tie-breaking mechanism as in Sobel [15]: although there may be more than
one outcome that generates utility vector  (~ u1; ~ u2), all of them generate the
same utility when evaluated in the true utility functions. Thus, the distor-
tion game is well dened.
An appealing property of the Nash bargaining solution is that the outcome
guarantees a certain amount (1
2) of the 0-1 normalized (reported) utilities to
the parties involved. This characteristic helps the agents to be in some sense
protected against misrepresentation of utilities by their opponents. This
property has been known in the literature as symmetric monotonicity (Sobel
[15]) or midpoint dominance axiom (Thomson [17]). Actually, it was Sobel
who rst discovered its relevance for distortion games. The next proposition
indicates that Nash bargaining satises this property. Although Sobel proved
it rst, in the appendix we follow Moulin's proof because it does not use risk
sensitivity considerations.
Proposition 2 (Sobel [15], Moulin [12]) For any pair of utility functions
u1;u2 2 U, then NB(UPS(u1;u2);(0;0))  1
2.
The previous result gives a lower bound for an agent's payo in \reported
utility units". One might suspect that when agents only manage to obtain
this lower bound, it is because they are at a Nash equilibrium of the distor-
tion game. Indeed, the following proposition proves that guess is correct.
74 Characterization of Nash Equilibria
4.1 Nash Equilibrium Strategies
We will now characterize the set of Nash equilibria in the distortion game.





2) is not a convex set. In this case, the conditions needed to reach
this potentially inecient equilibrium are:
1. u
1(x)  1




2 implies that u1(~ 1   x)  1
2.
In this case, neither agent has any incentive to \convexify" the UPS because
the opponent's strategy implies, by Proposition 2, that this kind of deviation
will not be an improvement. In a sense, agents were too greedy with their
claims and this precluded an agreement. On the other hand, notice that if
agents are truthful and play this kind of Nash equilibrium, the outcome will
be ex-ante ecient.
Proposition 3 Assume UPS(u
1;u
2) is convex. Then, the pair (u
1;u
2) is a










Proof: First, suppose that (u
1;u
2) is a Nash equilibrium of the distortion
game. Clearly,  (u
1;u
2)  1
2 so that the agents do not want to deviate









show that agent 1 can improve his payo by choosing ~ u1 in such a way that
the Pareto frontier of the set UPS((~ u1;u
2);(0;0)) is linear. Proposition 1
implies that this can be done by setting ~ u1(x) = 1   h(u
1(x)) where h is
dened as the function that describes the original Pareto frontier (see Sec-
tion 2). To show the previous claim, consider the Pareto optimal allocations




2(~ 1   x)) and
8 (~ u1;u
2) = (~ u1(~ x);u
2(~ 1   ~ x)). We know that u
2(~ 1   x) > u




1(~ x), allocation (x;~ 1   x) would Pareto dominate alloca-
tion (~ x;~ 1 ~ x), a contradiction. We conclude that agent 1 increases his payo
by choosing utility function ~ u1.
For the converse, suppose (u
1;u
2) is not a Nash equilibrium of the dis-
tortion game but conditions 1 and 2 hold. Then, without loss of gener-




2, agent 1 will have incentives to deviate only if UPS(u0
1;u
2)
is also convex. Let (x;~ 1   x) and (~ x;~ 1   ~ x) be allocations that gen-
erate utility vectors NB(UPS(u
1;u
2);(0;0)) and NB(UPS(~ u1;u
2);(0;0))
respectively. Agent 1 is better o, so u1(x) < u1(~ x). As u
1 2 U1, we
have u




2. Now, by Proposi-
tion 2 u
2(~ 1   ~ x) = NB2(UPS(~ u1;u
2);(0;0))  1
2. But then, the product
u
1(~ x)u
2(~ 1   ~ x) would be strictly greater than 1
4, contradicting the fact that
the vector generated by Nash bargaining was (1
2; 1
2). 
Finally, we conclude that if agents are in a Nash equilibrium of the distor-
tion game and the UPS constructed with the reported utilities is convex,
then the Pareto frontier of the UPS must be linear. Let us emphasize that
unlike the case where onle concave utility functions are admissible, a linear
Pareto frontier does not imply linear reported utilities. A possible case of a
Nash equilibrium is constituted by truth-telling agents, one risk averse and
the other one risk loving, compounding into a linear Pareto-frontier.
Corollary 1 Assume UPS(u
1;u
2) is convex. If the pair (u
1;u
2) is a Nash




Proof: Suppose that h(v) 6= 1   v. Then UPS(u
1;u
2) must contain a util-
ity pair (v;w) such that v + w > 1. Without lost of generality, assume





of the UPS as it is a linear combination of (v;w) and (1;0). Furthermore,
v + w > 1 implies that w/(1 + w   v) > 1
2. But we know that the util-
ity vector generated by Nash bargaining must be (1
2; 1
2). Thus the vector  
w/(1 + w   v);w/(1 + w   v)

 1
2, a contradiction. 
94.2 Nash Equilibrium Outcomes
Given that ordinal preferences are xed, the allocation generating the Nash
bargaining utility vector will always be Pareto optimal. Nevertheless, if the
game is decided by throwing a coin, the outcome is (possibly) inecient. In
what follows, we characterize which Pareto optimal allocations can arise as
the result of Nash equilibrium of the distortion game. We conclude that in
this setting agents may arrive to multiple of ecient allocations. The only
condition for a Pareto optimal allocation to be supported as a Nash equi-
librium outcome is that both agents actually prefer their outcome to the
(expected) utility generated by throwing a coin.
Proposition 4 A Pareto optimal allocation (x;~ 1 x) can be supported as
a Nash equilibrium outcome of the distortion game if and only if u1(x)  1
2
and u2(~ 1   x)  1
2.
Proof: Let u
2 2 U2 be such that u
1(1   x) = 1
2. Let h : [0;1] ! [0;1]
describe the Pareto frontier of UPS(u1;u
2). Dene u
1(x) = 1   h(u1(x)).
Proposition 1 implies u









2, Proposition 3 implies that (u
1;u
2) is a Nash equilibrium
supporting the allocation (x;~ 1   x). 
5 Implications of the Results
Assume that one of the two bargainers is strictly more risk averse than his
opponent. When agents are only allowed risk-averse claims, the unique out-
come of the distortion game will be biassed in favor of the more risk-averse
agent: the closer an agent is to being risk-neutral, the less room he has to
manipulate his utility function. We now present an example to illustrate our
point.
Two agents are deciding the allocation of two commodities. The true utility
functions over X are u1(x) = (x1x2)
1
4 and u2(x) = (x1x2)
1
2. The true Pareto
frontier is then described by the function h(v) = 1   v2. The utility vector





10corresponding outcome is given by the allocation (1
3!; 2
3!) where ! represents
the aggregate output.
If agents can only report risk-averse utility functions, in the dominant strat-
egy equilibrium agent 2 remains being truthful (notice that this utility fuc-
tion is already linear along the diagonal) while agent 1 chooses ~ u1(x) =
~ h 1(h(u1(x))) = (x1x2)
1
2 to represent his preferences. Symmetry then im-
plies that the new utility vector will be (1
2; 1
2) and equal division of both
goods will occur. This outcome is biassed in favor of the agent that was able
to lie about his utility function.
Now let us analyze what happens if agents are allowed to report utility func-
tions that are not concave. In this case, the set of Pareto optimal allocations
that arise from Nash equilibrium is







We observe that the outcome selected by the dominant strategies implied
by the concavity restriction lies, in this particular case, on one end of the
interval. The more risk-averse agent is clearly aided by the procedure used
to determine the nal allocation.
Although in our environment we must still select an outcome among many,
at least the chosen outcome will not invariably favor more risk-averse agents.
In our setting the outcome of the negotiation will depend much more on the
bargaining abilities of the parties unlike the previous model where agents
had a predetermined result, independent of their level of risk aversion.
Another important implication from the results is that they clearly point
towards a rst-mover advantage. If one of the agents is able to credibly com-
mit to a strategy, that party is in position to decide which Pareto optimal
allocation is used. The midpoint dominance axiom (Propostition 2) trans-
forms a report ~ u1 into a non-agreement threat unless the bargaining outcome
assigns at least a certain amount of utility (namely the utility obtained from
allocations x 2 X such that ~ u1(x) = 1
2) to agent i. This kind of advantage
is not present when agents are restricted to claim concave utility functions
because the order of play is not important when dominant strategies exist.
11Appendix: proofs
Lemma 1 Given two utility functions u1;u2 2 U, the function h that describes the Pareto
frontier of the set UPS(u1;u2) satises h(0) = 1, h(1) = 0, and is strictly decreasing (thus
invertible). Furthermore, if u1 and u2 are (strictly) concave, then h is (strictly) concave.
Proof: By strict monotonicity, u1(x) = 0 implies x = ~ 0. Thus, h(0) = u1(~ 1  ~ 0) = 1.
Similarly, h(1) = 0.
Now we prove that h is strictly decreasing. Take any  v;v 2 [0;1] such that  v > v. The
denition of h implies that there is a vector  x 2 X such that ( v;h( v)) = (u1( x);u2(~ 1  x)).
By strict monotonicity and continuity of u1, there exists an  2 [0;1) such that u1( x) = v.
Then
h( v) = u2(~ 1    x) < u2(~ 1    x)  max
u1(x)=v
u2(~ 1   x) = h(v);
so that h is strictly decreasing.
For concavity, let ^ v;  v; 2 [0;1]. Let ^ x be a vector satisfying u1(^ x) = ^ v and h(^ v) =
u2(~ 1 ^ x). In a similar manner, let  x be a vector satisfying u1( x) =  v and h( v) = u2(~ 1  x).
Then
h(^ v + (1   ) v) = h(u1(^ x) + (1   )u1( x))
 h(u1(^ x + (1   ) x))
= max
u1(x)=u1(^ x+(1 ) x)
u2(~ 1   x)
 u2(~ 1   (^ x + (1   ) x))
= u2((~ 1   ^ x) + (1   )(~ 1    x))
 u2(~ 1   ^ x) + (1   )u2(~ 1    x)
= h(^ v) + (1   )h( v);
as desired. If either u1 or u2 is strictly concave, the inequality is strict. 
Proposition 2 (Sobel [15], Moulin [12]) For any pair of utility functions u1;u2 2 U,
then NB(UPS(u1;u2);(0;0))  1
2.
Proof: Let (v;w) = NB(UPS(u1;u2);(0;0)). Consider the sets
A = UPS(u1;u2) and B = f(v;w) 2 R2
+ : vw  vwg:
12The sets A and B are convex and have disjoint interiors. Hence, there must exist a
hyperplane H separating A from B. As (v;w) lies on the frontier of both sets, (v;w) 2
H. Moreover, H must be tangent to B at (v;w), which implies that its slope is  w

v .
Thus, H must be described by the equation
w =  
w
v v + 2w:
This implies that (2v;0);(0;2w) 2 H. However, for (2v;0) or (0;2w) not to lie in the
interior of A, it must be true that (v;w)  1
2, as desired. 
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